Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 8

9-1-2000

Second Update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview
Gregory J. Hobbs

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Gregory J. Hobbs, Second Update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev.
111 (2000).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

ARTICLE UPDATE
SECOND UPDATE TO
COLORADO WATER LAW. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the
second update to Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, Appendix 1
Colorado Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law, selected by The
Honorable GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr.

Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden
"[P]rior to the modern trend of implementing express volumetric
limitations in decrees, most water rights were quantified by a two-part
measurement. First, a decree contained a flow-rate of water, in c.f.s.,
which the owner was entitled to divert from the stream. Second, a
decree stated the use to which that diverted water could be put, such
as irrigation of crops or municipal uses."
Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 197 (Colo.
1999) (citation omitted).
"From the late 1800s to the early 1970s, courts primarily employed
one standard method in order to protect the vested rights ofjuniors in
change proceedings. Under this method, the court would order the
petitioner to abandon a portion of his or her originally decreed flow
This flow abandonment was then
right back to the stream.
incorporated into the express terms of the change decree."
Id. at 197-98 (citation omitted).

"With the advent of improved engineering techniques, courts
began to utilize another approach to prevent injury to juniors in
change proceedings. Under the modern method, courts now translate

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U.
DENY. WATER L. REv. 223 (1999).
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the petitioner's historical consumptive use into a volumetric limitation
stated in acre-feet. Courts then incorporate the volume limit into the
express terms of the decree. Therefore, most modern change decrees
impose an acre-foot limit on the amount of water an appropriator may
consume in the average year.
This shift in the methods employed to protect juniors in change
proceedings accounts for the difference between Golden's decrees,
granted in the early 1960s, and Con Mutual's change decree, granted
in 1993. Whereas the 60s decrees only required Golden to abandon a
portion of its flow entitlement in order to protect junior users, Con
Mutual's decree imposed a volumetric limit on the amount of Priority
12 water it is entitled to consume."
Id. at 198 (citations omitted).
"Appellants argue that their claim requesting the addition of
volumetric limitations to the 60s decrees is not precluded because, as a
matter of law, the 60s decrees contain implied volumetric limitations.
In support of this contention, the appellants urge us to extend the rule
first announced in Orr, to the facts of the instant case. However, as we
decline to extend the rule in Orr, we find the appellants' claim that
volumetric limitations should be added to the 60s decrees is
precluded."
Id. at 199-200 (citation omitted).

"An examination of Orr and Midway Ranches reveals the proper
standard for our review. In each individual case, we must review the
record of the prior proceeding in order to determine whether
historical consumptive use was calculated and relied upon in the
formation of the earlier decree. If so, we will not modify the resulting
decree by implying volumetric limitations into its terms. The implied
volumetric limitation doctrine in Orr was developed in order to
prevent injury to juniors when a prior change decree did not address
or contemplate the question of historical consumptive use. This
doctrine was not developed in order to provide juniors with a method
to insert volumetric limitations where they were previously absent,
even though historical consumptive use formed the basis for the
earlier decree."
Id. at 201 (citations omitted).

"[W] e find that the doctrine of issue preclusion is unavailable to
the appellants in this case. Appellants contend that Golden is
precluded from asserting that the 60s decrees contain no volumetric
limitations because.., the 1993 Con Mutual proceedings cannot
accomplish that which is barred by virtue of claim preclusion."
Id.

"If we were to allow the 60s decrees to be reopened for the
addition of volumetric limitations, then the appellants' argument that
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the 1993 litigation collaterally establishes the appropriate acre-footage
terms of these decrees would be relevant. However, as we will not
reopen the 60s decrees in order to imply volumetric limitations, the
appellants' reliance on issue preclusion is misplaced."
Id.

"While it is true that a decree for change in use may not again be
collaterally attacked insofar as previously litigated injurious effects are
concerned, this does not bar junior appropriators from bringing later
suits regarding new injuries that were not previously litigated and
which arose after the change was decreed."
Id. at 202 (citations omitted).

"As Golden's municipal use had not even been decreed at the time
of the 60s proceedings, it is obvious that the appellants could not have
brought their claims of enlarged use based on changing municipal use
patterns and increased lawn irrigation. Furthermore, the appellants'
second and third claims of enlarged use in the instant case are
sustained by different evidence than that presented in the 60s
proceedings. As the water court is not precluded from considering
new claims of injury based on allegations of changed circumstances,
the appellants' allegations of enlarged use in the instant case are
permissible."
Id. at 203.

"Therefore, in the instant case, Golden may not enlarge the use of
its decreed rights by changing its pattern of municipal use or by using
its water to irrigate lawn acreage which was not anticipated at the time
its change in use decree was entered. As it would contradict the most
basic principles governing all water decrees were we to allow a party to
enlarge its use in such a manner, we must reject Golden's assertion
that the appellants' second and third enlarged use claims are
precluded."
Id.

Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
v. Chevron Shale Oil Co.
"The water court recognized that, in light of the fact that the
production of oil from shale is not currently economically feasible,
Chevron's efforts, although minimal, were sufficient to demonstrate a
steady application of effort to complete its appropriation in a
reasonably expedient and efficient manner. We defer to those
findings. In addition, we reject the Subdistrict's contention that
Chevron was required to additionally prove that it 'can and will' use
the water rights."
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., 986 P.2d
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918, 923 (Colo. 1999).

"We agree with Chevron that the water court properly considered
the current economic feasibility of the shale oil project. The plain
language of section 37-92-301(4) (c) recognizes that current economic
conditions beyond the control of the applicant might adversely affect
efforts to perfect the water right. This provision prohibits courts from
using such a circumstance to deny a diligence application when there
is other evidence of reasonable diligence. As a result, when current
economic conditions beyond the control of an applicant slow progress
towards the perfection of a conditional water right, it is not improper
for a court to consider the effect of the adverse economic conditions."
Id. at 923-24.

"In this case, there is undisputed evidence that Chevron exercised
reasonable diligence despite the adverse economic conditions in the
shale oil industry. As noted, supra, the water court found that Chevron
had planned for a diversion facility, planned a dam on Roan Creek,
planned for pipeline facilities, prepared environmental baseline
studies, prepared a detailed master planning document for Chevron's
Parachute Creek Unit, and had participated in miscellaneous activities
related to the conditional water rights such as litigation, research
projects, and studies. Therefore, we hold that it was not improper for
the water court to consider the economic conditions of the shale oil
industry when it made its reasonable diligence determination, and we
reject the Subdistrict's contention."
Id. at 924.

Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, L.L.P. v. Bargas
"The recommendations of the Getches and Bishop Committees
formed the basis of Senate Bill 5, which the General Assembly
eventually enacted with a nontributary definition as set out in section
37-90-103(10.5)....
[T]he senators were aware that different
hydrological formations in different areas of the state might require
distinct administration....
Elliott and Simpson's statements
corroborate what appears clear from all of the Senate hearings: that
the designation of the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifers in subsection (10.5) was designed to modify the
definition of nontributary for purposes of the Denver Basin only. The
senators understood that this modification would result in the loss of
approximately 40,000 acre feet of ground water then discharging from
the four enumerated aquifers, because the hydrostatic head of those
aquifers would be disregarded in determining whether they were
nontributary. However, they also understood that Senate Bill 5
accounted for this loss by requiring augmentation from the four
aquifers back into the Denver Basin to an extent that would sufficiently
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offset the loss of the hydrostatic overflow, which in the Denver Basin
formations of the four enumerated aquifers was approximately 40,000
acre feet per year. There is no indication anywhere in the legislative
record that any senators were aware of the existence of the South Park
formation of the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer. Moreover, they had no
knowledge concerning the amount of hydrostatic overflow occurring
in that formation or the amount of augmentation that would be
necessary to avoid injury to senior surface water rights in proximity to
that formation."
Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, L.L.P. v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 271-72 (Colo.1999).

"Mr. Harrison also explained the augmentation requirements of
Senate Bill 5 for nontributary and "not nontributary" wells. Like the
definitional subsection at (10.5), the augmentation provisions at
sections 37-90-137(9) (b) and (c) referred only to 'the Dawson, Denver,
Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers.' They made no express
After detailing the rules for
mention of the Denver Basin.
augmentation, Mr. Harrison told the representatives: 'Again let me put
this overall perspective on it. These specific rules apply only to the Denver
Basin formations.'
Id. at 272-73.

"Thus, [Park County Sportsmen's Ranch] is entitled to pursue
water rights to the ground water beneath its lands in South Park
pursuant to the doctrine of prior appropriation in accordance with the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, but, to
the extent that it makes out-of-priority diversions, it must avoid
material injurious depletions to senior surface rights."
Id. at 275.

Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
v. OXY USA, Inc.
"The very nature of a conditional right suggests that the 'can and
will' test applies until the right matures into an absolute decree. A
conditional water right 'encourage [s] development of water resources
by allowing the applicant to complete financing, engineering, and
construction with the certainty that if its development plan succeeds, it
will be able to obtain an absolute water right.' At each successive stage
of the project, parties must appear before the court to demonstrate
sufficient work to prove that the applicant is moving toward
completion of the project. Unless the applicant makes this showing,
the conditional right is speculative and violates the anti-speculation
doctrine. In this respect, the anti-speculation doctrine and the 'can
and will' requirement are closely related, although the 'can and will'
test is slightly more stringent.
Recently in Chevron, we stated that the holder of a conditional
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water right was not required to meet the 'can and will' test in addition
to proving reasonable diligence. However, in that case, the court
already had determined that Chevron sufficiently demonstrated 'a
steady application of effort to complete its appropriation in a
reasonably expedient and efficient manner.' Under the facts of that
case, that conclusion by the water court was sufficient to satisfy both
the 'can and will' standard and the reasonable diligence standard.
In general, the 'can and will' test requires an applicant to establish
'a substantial probability that this intended appropriation can and will
reach fruition .... 'Proof of such a substantial probability involves use
of current information and necessarily imperfect predictions of future
events and conditions.' An analysis of current economic conditions
beyond the control of the applicant is a part of the 'can and will' test.
We perceive no error in the water court's ruling either as to the
statement of the law or the application of that law to the facts. The
water court concluded that the oil shale project is technically feasible
given current technology-or, in other words, that OXY 'can'
complete the project. The court found that OXY 'will' complete the
project when the current economic conditions facing the oil shale
industry no longer exist. As we noted in Chevron, the General
Assembly has made a policy decision that the infeasibility of
development of oil shale under current economic conditions should
not cause applicants like OXY to lose their conditional rights. We are
bound by that policy determination."
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 708
(Colo. 1999) (citations omitted).

"The Subdistrict correctly claims that hexennial diligence
applications are subject to the anti-speculation doctrine and that
section 37-92-301(4) (c) does not exempt conditional water rights from
application of that doctrine. We declined to address this issue in
Chevron because the parties did not properly raise the question before
the water court.
The anti-speculation doctrine, which prohibits the acquisition of a
conditional right without a vested interest or a specific plan to possess
and control water for a specific beneficial use, clearly applies to the
initial entry of a conditional decree.
The anti-speculation doctrine initially was intended to prohibit the
entry of conditional decrees when the holder had nothing more than
an intent to sell the right at an unknown time in the future for profit.
However, because a conditional right, or some portion of that right,
may become speculative over time, we now hold that just as the 'can
and will' test continues to apply in later diligence proceedings, so does
the anti-speculation doctrine. Again, the nature of a conditional water
right dictates this conclusion. If a water right initially clears the antispeculation hurdle, yet later becomes speculative, then the project is
not moving toward completion and beneficial use. 'Speculation on
the market, or sale expectancy, is wholly foreign to the principle of
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keeping life in a proprietary right and is no excuse for failure to
perform that which the law requires.'
In the instant case, the water court's finding that OXY
demonstrated steady effort to complete the appropriation was
OXY's investments, in this diligence
sufficient on this point.
proceeding and earlier proceedings, demonstrate that it intends to
pursue the project to completion in the future. No questions were
raised about the need for the full water rights once OXY actually
begins to produce oil shale. The only issues that the Subdistrict asserts
are those related to economic feasibility and timing of the project.
Accordingly, the water court findings are sufficient to satisfy both the
'can and will' standard and the anti-speculation requirements of
Colorado law."
Id. at 708-09 (citations omitted).

Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson
"Property rights in water are usufructuary; ownership of the
resource itself remains in the public. Because beneficial use defines
the genesis and maturation of every appropriative water right in this
state, we have held that every decree includes an implied limitation
that diversions cannot exceed that which can be used beneficially, and
that the right to change a water right is limited to that amount of water
actually used beneficially pursuant to the decree at the appropriator's
place of use. Thus, the right to change a point of diversion, or type,
place, or time of use, is limited in quantity by the appropriation's
historic use.
These limitations advance the fundamental principles of Colorado
and western water law that favor optimum use, efficient water
management, and priority administration, and disfavor speculation
and waste. Adherence to these principles serves to extend the benefit
of the resource to as many water rights as there is water available for
use in Colorado.
Quantification of the amount of water beneficially consumed in
the placement of water to the appropriator's use guards against
rewarding wasteful practices or recognizing water claims that are not
justified by the nature and extent of the appropriator's need."
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54-55 (Colo.
1999) (citations omitted).

"An undecreed change of use of a water right cannot provide the
basis for quantifying the right for change purposes. The amount of
consumable water available for transfer depends upon the historic
beneficial consumptive use of the appropriation for its decreed
purpose at its place of use. However, when historic use of a water right
has been litigated and determined through a prior change
proceeding, the court's judgment and decree control the matter, and

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 4

the historic use inquiry cannot be reopened, absent a further
undecreed change or enlargement."
Id. at 59.

"The question before the Water Court was whether an undecreed
change of the two [Colorado Fuel and Iron Company] water rights can
be the basis for decreeing a change of those rights, without regard to
the amount of water consumed beneficially for CF & I's original
appropriation. The Water Court correctly refused to allow Santa Fe
Ranches to substitute evidence of an undecreed change to irrigation
use under the El Moro Ditch for evidence of the historic
manufacturing usage of the two CF & I water rights for its facility."
Id.

Upper Black Squirrel Ground Water Management District v. Goss
"Because the [Ground Water] Commission has authority to
supervise and control the exercise and administration of rights
acquired to the use of designated ground water 'except to the extent
that similar authority is vested in ground water management districts
pursuant to section 37-90-130(2),' § 37-90-111 (1) (a), the Management
District has jurisdiction over controversies between appropriators
regarding issues of injury to senior well withdrawals by junior well
withdrawals. This authority includes the capacity 'by summary order
[to] prohibit or limit withdrawal of water from any well during any
period that it determines that such withdrawal of water from said well
would cause unreasonable injury to prior appropriators,' authority
which the Commission would have in the absence of the Management
District."
Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177, 1187
(Colo. 2000) (footnote omitted).

"We have deferred to the General Assembly's choice to allocate
and enforce rights in ground water not part of the natural stream
waters, in three subcategories: (1) designated ground water; (2)
nontributary water outside of designated ground water basins; and (3)
nontributary and not-nontributary Denver Basin bedrock water of the
Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers."
Id. at 1182.

Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
v. Getty Oil Exploration Co.
"As we noted in OXY, the addition of this section [§ 37-92301 (4) (c)] is evidence that 'the General Assembly has made a policy
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decision that the infeasibility of development of oil shale under
current economic conditions should not cause applicants like OXY to
lose their conditional rights."'
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Getty Oil Exploration Co., 997 P.2d
557, 565 (Colo. 2000) (citation omitted).

"The 'can and will' test requires an applicant to establish 'a
substantial probability that this intended appropriation can and will
reach fruition.... Proof of such a substantial probability involves the
use of current information and necessarily imperfect predictions of
future events and conditions.' As we noted in OXY, an analysis of
current economic conditions beyond the control of the applicant is
part of the 'can and will' test.
We conclude that our resolution of this issue is governed by our
decision in OXY As in OXY, the water court in the instant case found
that the oil shale project is technically feasible given current
technology, thus demonstrating that Getty 'can' complete the project.
The water court also found that Getty 'will go forward with the project
when it becomes economically feasible.' Therefore, we hold that the
water court properly interpreted and applied section 37-92-301(4) (c)
to the facts of the instant case."
Id. (citation omitted).

Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. v. Fazzio
"The evidence of disrepair and unusable conditions of the ditches
in this case and their non-repair is consistent with a finding of nonuse.
Water rights are usufructuary in nature, and nonuse retires the use
entitlement to the stream. When this occurs, the property rights
adhering to the particular water right no longer exist. In Twin Lakes,
we upheld a water court's decree of abandonment after looking to
evidence showing the unusable state of the ditches in question. We
stated, 'Nonuse can be manifested by conditions inconsistent with
active use of a water right. Such conditions include failure to make
beneficial use of water [and] failure to repair or maintain diversion
structures.'"
Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 553 (Colo. 2000) (citations omitted).

2
Board of County Commissioners v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n

"In 1956, Congress passed the Colorado River Storage Project Act
(CRSPA). See 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1994). This act authorized the

2. A transcription of the oral argument to the Colorado Supreme Court follows
this summary.
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construction of several dams in the Upper Basin, including Glen
Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and the Wayne N. Aspinall Unit
(previously Curecanti). See id. § 620. Congress enacted CRSPA to
assist the Upper Basin states in developing their allocation of water,
producing hydropower, and ensuring Compact deliveries, among
other uses."
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo.
2000).
"Congress approved the construction and operation of several
dams and reservoirs, including the Aspinall Unit, for the nonexclusive
purposes of regulating the flow of the Colorado River, storing water
for beneficial consumptive use, making it possible for the States of the
Upper Basin to utilize, consistently with the provisions of the Colorado
River Compact, the apportionments made to and among them in the
Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, respectively, providing for the reclamation of arid and
semiarid land, for the control of floods, and for the generation of
hydroelectric power, as an incident of the foregoing purposes. Id. §
620. Congress also stated that it did not intend for CRSPA to impede
the Upper Basin's development of the water apportioned to it by the
Compact. See id. § 620b (1994).
We agree that the CRSPA reservoirs are part of a plan to allow
Colorado to develop and preserve Compact apportionment. However,
we find that the stored water provides Colorado with an ability to
satisfy the Compact delivery mandates without eroding other rights
decreed to beneficial use in the state. See H.R. Doc. No. 201, at 31
(1959). By banking CRSPA water for Compact deliveries and using the
reservoirs for their other decreed purposes, Colorado continues
development of its water entitlements. See id. The Aspinall Unit holds
absolute decrees, and a right to use the water for the decreed
purposes-including hydropower generation. Contrary to Arapahoe's
assertion, we do not view those waters as being available for
appropriation."
Id. at 334-35.
"Arapahoe contends that the Aspinall Unit's operations cannot
preclude in-state water users from developing the Basin's water
resources. The water court found that BUREC stored and released
water from the Aspinall Unit not only for hydropower, but for other
beneficial purposes, including flood control, fish and wildlife,
recreation, irrigation, and domestic uses, under the appropriative
rights for the Unit. Hence, in establishing the parameters for water
availability based on our 1995 decision, the water court properly
ordered the parties to respect the historic exercise of the Aspinall
absolute decrees for all its beneficial uses."
Id. at 336.
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"Arapahoe argues that CRSPA section 620 reflects Congressional
intent to subrogate the generation of hydropower to other CRSPA
uses, and that section 620b provides that Congress did not intend for
the authorized projects to interfere with the Upper Basin States'
comprehensive development of their apportioned water. See 43 U.S.C.
§§ 620, 620b. Arapahoe posits that these provisions alone demand the
subordination of hydropower generation to other beneficial uses in
Colorado."
Id.

"The United States has absolute decrees for the Aspinall Unit. The
decrees permit power generation, and Colorado law defines power
generation as a legitimate beneficial use. See § 37-95-103(2), 10 C.R.S.
(2000). Thus, senior water rights for hydropower generation may
place a call on the river. The General Assembly, and our 1995
decision in this case, did not set forth any different treatment for
hydropower rights.
In the second trial, the water court gave effect to the state water
rights for the Aspinall Unit in order of the decrees. We agree that
federal preemption does not provide otherwise. The water court
recognized that CRSPA authorized the construction of the Aspinall
Unit only after economic justification of the project. See 43 U.S.C. §
620. Therefore, the water court directed the parties to model the
conditions of the river, including the historical use of water by Aspinall
Unit for all of its decreed purposes, despite references in CRSPA that
characterize hydropower generation as an incidental use. The
historical use of the full decreed amount by the Aspinall Unit within
Colorado for its decreed purposes prevents Arapahoe County from
claiming any portion of the appropriated water for its project."
Id. at 337.

"43 U.S.C. § 620f (1994) ... plainly states that CRSPA's
hydroelectric powerplants shall not interfere with the other major
compacts affecting the Upper Basin, nor the appropriation of water
for domestic and agricultural purposes under state law.
In this case, the other major compacts impacting the Upper Basin
are the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Basin Compact.
Section 620h of CRSPA specifically demands that courts interpret
CRSPA consistently with the Colorado River Compact and the Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact. See 43 U.S.C. § 620h (1994).
Article IV(c) of the Colorado River Compact provides that '[t]he
provisions of this article shall not apply to or interfere with the
regulation and control by any state within its boundaries of the
appropriation, use and distribution of water.' § 37-61-101, art. IV(c),
10 C.R.S. (2000). This provision defers to Colorado's water law.
Additionally, the Upper Basin Compact states that 'the provisions
of this compact shall not apply to or interfere with the right or power
of any signatory state to regulate within its boundaries the
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appropriation, use and control of water, the consumptive use of which
is apportioned and available to such state by this compact.' § 37-62101, art. XV(b), 10 C.R.S. (2000) (also referring to storage and use of
water for generation of electrical energy). Thus, the hydropower
components of both compacts defer to state law.
Colorado law provides for priority administration of decreed
hydropower appropriative rights within the state. Congress clearly
expressed its intent that the hydropower features of CRSPA neither
operate to prevent the Upper Basin States from meeting their
Compact requirements at Lee Ferry, nor to change the Upper Basin
state allocation of waters. On the other hand, Congress deferred to
state law for deciding and administering appropriative rights within
the boundaries of each state. Congress did not intend to create a
different law for the Aspinall Unit.
We conclude that the water court did not err in giving effect to the
hydropower water rights of the Aspinall Unit for purposes of
determining availability of water for junior conditional rights under
the 'can and will' test."
Id. at 338.

"Colorado law also identifies flood control as a beneficial use. We
reject Arapahoe's argument that operation of the Aspinall Unit for
flood control purposes results in a waste of water and that Arapahoe
should be able to appropriate water that would otherwise be evacuated
from the Aspinall Unit in the flood control operation. CRSPA
provides for flood control as one of the purposes of its authorized
reservoirs. See 43 U.S.C. § 620. The United States holds state
appropriative rights and decrees for 'flood control' purposes and may
exercise them along with all other decreed uses of the project."
Id. at 338-39.

"Arapahoe also addresses the United States' impoundment and
release of water from the Aspinall Unit for fish and wildlife and
recreational uses. Arapahoe contends that Congress intended those
uses, like power generation, as incidental uses that would be
subordinate to junior upstream water rights.

... Congress established the Curecanti National Recreation Area at
the Aspinall Unit. See 16 U.S.C. § 410fff-9 (Supp. 1999). Congress
invested nearly $30,000,000 in the site and it draws over a million
visitors annually. To accommodate the great number of boaters, Blue
Mesa must be kept at an adequate level to maximize the navigable
surface of the lake.
The Jicarillacourt rejected the construction of reservoirs solely for
recreational purposes. Here, of course, the reservoirs are not solely
for recreation. More persuasively, the 1968 Act, not mentioned by the
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Tenth Circuit in its opinion, as well as the existence of the absolute
water rights for recreation and fish and wildlife support the water
court's legal conclusions. Recreation and fish and wildlife are
recognized beneficial uses in Colorado. Accordingly, we hold that
both because Congress specifically authorized a recreational use and
because the recreational use is but one of the purposes of the
reservoirs, ficarilla does not apply."
Id. at 339-40.

"We affirm the water court in its conclusions that the 60,000 acrefeet to which BUREC agreed to subordinate their uses are available
only to in-basin users; and the 240,000 acre-foot marketable pool is
available for use in-basin or transbasin, but only by contract with
BUREC."
Id. at 340.

"We find the in-basin 60,000 acre-foot subordination by the United
States valid. The construction of the Aspinall Unit greatly benefited
the Gunnison River Basin, but not without adverse effects. The dams
inundated many miles of prime trout fishing and flooded several
properties. To offset these losses, the United States agreed to set aside
60,000 acre-feet of water for future projects to benefit the Upper
Gunnison River Basin.

We agree with the water court that Arapahoe is not entitled to the
benefit of the subordination agreement because of its proposed
transbasin uses, and therefore we find it unnecessary to consider if
BUREC has consented to increase the subordination beyond 60,000
acre-feet.

[T]he storage and release of water from the Aspinall Unit for
Compact delivery purposes aids Colorado in meeting its Compact
obligations, thereby benefiting the state's water users. Second, the
commitment of the United States to make the marketable pool
available for uses within Colorado will serve the CRSPA purpose of
aiding the state's use of its Compact apportionment. Third, by
enforcing the Aspinall absolute decrees as we would any other absolute
decree, we clarify that the water rights of the United States carry the
same benefits and responsibilities as all other decreed water rights."
Id. at 341-42 (footnote omitted).

"The water court made a factual finding that Aspinall's marketable
pool consisted of 240,000 acre-feet of water available for consumptive
use. BUREC currently uses this water for multiple decreed purposes,
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and has contracted with others for only a small fraction of the total
available marketable pool. The United States conceded on oral
argument that both the Eastern and Western Slopes could use this
pool beneficially through reoperation of the reservoir....

Section

620c of CRSPA authorizes BUREC to enter into both irrigation and
municipal contracts with water users. See 43 U.S.C. § 620c (1994). The
beneficial uses listed in the Aspinall Unit's final decree, Case No.
80CW156, include domestic and municipal uses. Therefore, although
Arapahoe may not obtain a separate appropriation of the waters
already decreed to the Aspinall Unit, Arapahoe may seek a contract
with BUREC to use the water for municipal purposes."
lI& at 342.

ORAL ARGUMENT
BOARD OF COUNTY CoMMISSIONERS V. CRYSTAL CREEK HOMEOWNERS'Ass'N

Board of County Commissioners v. Crystal Creek Homeowners'Ass'n was a
complex decision involving several different facets of water law. The
case has been in progress for almost ten years. In 1995, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in the first trial by
considering conditional decrees senior to the Aspinall Unit decree.
The court also held that only historically exercised decrees should be
counted when determining the amount of water available to meet the
"can and will" test. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial
court to determine the historic operation of the Aspinall Unit. The
trial court again found that insufficient water for the applicants to
meet the "can and will" test existed. The applicants appealed that
decision on several grounds. A transcription of the oral argument to
the Colorado Supreme Court from the second appeal follows.
JUSTICES IN ATTENDANCE AT ORAL ARGUMENT, MARCH

1, 2000:

ChiefJustice MaryJ. Mullarkey
Justice Gregory Kellam Scott4
Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis
Justice GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr.
Justice AlexJ. Martinez
Justice Michael L. Bender
Justice Nancy E. Rice
CHIEF JUSTICE MULLARKEY: Parties are at counsel table and we're

3. 14 P.3d 325 (Colo. 2000).
4. By the time the court decided this case, Justice Gregory K. Scott had retired
from the court and Justice Nathan B. Coats participated in the decision.
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ready for the appellant.
MR. ZILIS: Good morning. May it please the court? My name is Paul
Zilis and I'm joined at counsel table this morning byJohn Henderson.
We're both with the law firm of Vranesh and Raisch and we represent
the appellants in this case the Board of County Commissioners of the
County of Arapahoe and the Union Park Water Authority. During my
argument this morning, I plan to address this court's mandates from
the first appeal in this case and their importance in protecting the
Constitutional right to appropriate water in the state of Colorado. I
would also like to address the manner in which the U.S. facilities at the
Aspinall Unit on the Gunnison River should be considered in
determining water availability. This is also an issue of statewide
concern because the Gunnison River provides a large percentage of
the outflows of water from the state of Colorado in the Colorado River
Basin and the rulings in this case may very well determine whether
water will be appropriable under our apportionments under the
Colorado River compacts. As you know, this case concerns the Union
Park Reservoir Project. It's a large project proposed for development
in the Upper Gunnison Basin and the primary issue before this court
today is whether water is available for the conditional water rights for
that project. The reason that is the primary issue in this appeal is that
the Union Park Reservoir Project proposes to divert water only under
its own junior priorities. It will not require the dry up of any
agricultural lands and it will not require the acquisition of any senior
agricultural water rights in making water available for multiple
purposes. Because of this design it would divert water under junior
priorities which would mean that it would probably divert, and the
engineering analyses indicate that would divert, the vast majority of its
water only during the period of spring runoff, usually from the months
of April through earlyJuly. The reason that the project is designed in
this fashion is that there is a vast amount of water physically available
in the Gunnison Basin. We've prepared an exhibit here today (eight
and a half by eleven copies were passed out to the justices before
argument) to show the amount of water that flows out of the Gunnison
Basin under current conditions after use by all existing absolute water
rights.
QUESTION: Before you comment on that, is there any objection to
the use of this exhibit?
MR. SIMS: No.
CHIEF JUSTICE MULLARKEY: Go ahead.
MR. ZILIS: Thank you. As you can see from the exhibit, there are
currently annual average outflows of approximately 500,000 acre-feet
out of the East and Taylor Rivers, which are the rivers from which the
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Union Park Reservoir would divert, and those outflows occur after use
by all existing senior water rights. As the Gunnison River continues
downstream, it continues to grow exponentially. At the Aspinall Unit,
which I referred to earlier, there are approximately 1.2 million acrefeet which flow through that facility on an average annual basis.
QUESTION: Let me ask you about this 500,000, is that water that is
also released from the Aspinall Unit after having been stored for the
multiple purposes of the project?
MR. ZILIS: The 500,000 acre-feet is above the Aspinall Unit. The 1.2
million acre-feet is the average amount that's released through the
Aspinall Unit on an average annual basis.
QUESTION: Ok, I'm still trying to figure out what you're saying about
the 500,000 acre-feet, is it stored or is it not stored in the Aspinall
Unit?
MR. ZILIS: 500,000 is flowing out of the Upper Gunnison River Basin
after use by all the irrigation rights upstream. In other words, at the
confluence of the East and Taylor Rivers that form the Gunnison
River, there are 500,000 acre-feet which flow out of that Upper
Gunnison Basin and continue downstream.
QUESTION: Presumably they're going through the hydroelectric
facilities and they're passed through the Aspinall Unit.
MR. ZILIS: Correct. As a matter of fact, as the Gunnison River
continues to the Aspinall Unit it picks up other tributaries and it's
passing through an average of 1.2 million acre-feet per year.
QUESTION: Ok, thank you.
MR. ZILIS: The Gunnison River continues to grow as it continues
downstream. By the time it reaches its confluence with the Colorado
River near the city of Grand Junction, almost 2 million acre-feet flow
out of the Gunnison Basin annually. This is after use by all existing
water rights. Now, this case has been in litigation for over ten years for
a public entity to show that a portion of that water is available for
appropriation. The first trial was held in 1991 and the water court
found that only 20,000 acre-feet are available for appropriation out of
this vast amount of water that's flowing out of the Gunnison Basin.
That case was appealed to this court and this court reversed and
remanded the trial court on numerous grounds and set forth
numerous standards for the water court to consider in any remand
proceedings. It held that essentially the standards that were applied in
the first trial in that case foreclosed recognition of applications for
conditional water rights decrees that had every prospect of resulting in
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completed appropriations within a reasonable time. It held that it's
implicit in the constitution that there shall be maximum utilization of
water in the state of Colorado. Water is a very scarce and valuable
resource in this state and this court ordered the water court to
consider applications for conditional water rights in a manner that
would encourage the development of water resources in the state. The
court set forth some other standards. It set forth the standards of what
river conditions should be considered when a conditional water rights
application is before the court. It held that only the conditions on the
river at the time the applications were filed should be considered in
determining water availability, because those conditions give the best
picture of what water is available for appropriation and what water is
being put to beneficial use. This court also held that absolute water
decrees should only be considered based on the historic use rather
than their full decreed amounts. This court held that conditional
water rights should not be considered in determining water availability
if diversions are not being made under those rights. And it generally
made it very clear that the inquiry should be limited in determining
water availability to issue a conditional water right. The case was
remanded and the trial court held a second trial in October of 1997.
In that trial, it actually found less water available for appropriation
than it did in the initial trial. It found only approximately 15,000 acrefeet available for appropriation. And the issue before this court today
is whether the water court did comply with the mandates and
standards set forth in the first appeal. It's our position that the water
court did not, and it does not apply the doctrine of maximum
beneficial use in a way that would encourage the development of water
resources in the state. Now, the water court relied primarily on two
federal facilities to find that there was virtually no water available for
appropriation. They relied on the Aspinall Unit which I referred to
earlier, and the Taylor Park Reservoir. Now, the Aspinall Unit is the
other issue I'd like to discuss briefly this morning and I'd like to set
out for the court the posture of the issues surrounding the Aspinall
Unit for the remand trial as they relate to the mandates from this court
and as they relate to the way that the unit was considered for
determining water availability. The Aspinall Unit was at issue in the
initial trial and the water court held that the 1.2 million acre-feet that
are flowing through the Aspinall on an average annual basis, that
Justice Hobbs inquired about, is unavailable for upstream
appropriation. Those issues were appealed to this court and this court
elected not to specifically address the Aspinall Unit issues. However,
it's our position that it certainly addressed those issues by setting forth
the mandates that the water court was to consider in determining
water availability on remand.
QUESTION: Let me ask you about that because it looked in the
various orders that the trial court issued regarding the modeling and
the legal assumptions to be made on water availability, that he did look
at the absolute decrees for recreation, fish, hydropower, that had been
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previously granted in 1980, I believe, the absolute decrees, and he also
factored in, it seemed to me, this 240,000 acre-foot contract pool that
apparently is stored in the Aspinall Unit but used for these other
various purposes, and also the flood control purpose. So why isn't the
posture of this case that all the storage in the Aspinall Unit, in fact, has
been exercised in the past under these state decrees under section 8 of
the Reclamation Act in the River District's assignment to the United
States of those rights?
MR. ZILIS: That's an excellent question Justice Hobbs. The water
court actually held that none of the massive amounts of water which
do flow through the Aspinall Unit are available for appropriation, and
it held that in considering water availability one cannot look at what
purposes those water rights are used for. So in essence, what the
Water Court held, was that any water that flows through the Aspinall
Unit, from the minute it was built, is now appropriated under state law
and that there's no water available above that amount, in other words,
the full 1.2 million acre-feet which flow through the Aspinall Unit. It's
our position that that's directly contrary to the mandates of this court
and directly contrary to the mandates and the Congressional directives
in the Colorado River Storage Project Act, which authorized the
construction of that unit. As you are aware from the extensive briefing
on this issue, "CRSPA," or the Colorado River Storage Project Act, was
actually passed by Congress to allow the Upper Basin states to use their
compact apportionments. If this analysis that the water court applied
to the Aspinall Unit, is applied to the other Colorado River Storage
Project units, it would turn CRSPA on its head and would actually
prevent any further appropriations upstream of those units once those
units were on line. So it was our position in court that one has to look
at the individual uses of the water at the Aspinall Unit to determine
whether those uses should preclude upstream appropriation. It's very
clear from CRSPA that the very intent of this was to provide carry over
storage so that water could be stored in wet years and then only
released to the downriver states, the Lower Basin states, during
prolonged dry periods, so that the Upper Basin states would be
allowed to continue to divert and to develop their apportionments
under the compacts.
QUESTION: Mr. Zilis, if we were to take your position, would it mean
that the full 1.2 million acre-feet would be available for domestic and
municipal appropriation?
MR. ZILIS: Under current river conditions, we take the position that
the Aspinall Unit could not place a call on the river. That is because it
has not yet been used for these compact purposes. To date, it's never
been needed to release water to the downriver states in the dryer
periods.
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QUESTION: So the answer is yes.
MR. ZILIS: The answer is not yes. I think that the Colorado River
Storage Project Act was put into place so that the carry over storage
could be provided. Under current river conditions, I suppose one
could apply for very, very large appropriations upstream of that, but it
needs to be considered in a way that the carry over storage could be
available to the Lower Basin states. Under present conditions though,
it's not being used for consumptive uses to any extent. As Justice
Hobbs pointed out, it has a pool that's been aside for consumptive
uses in the amount of 240,000 acre-feet and it's only been used to the
extent of 78 acre-feet. The main function of the Aspinall Unit to date
has been the generation of power and flood control.
QUESTION: So the answer to the question would be that the only use
for which the domestic and municipal uses could be called out would
be to supply water at Lee's Ferry in accordance with the compact. Is
that right? Is that what you're saying?
MR. ZILIS: No, I think the other primary purposes are consumptive
uses.
QUESTION: So are the 200,000 and some odd acre-feet that are
reserved for consumptive uses and/or the historical or actual
consumptive use of 78 acre-feet at present?
MR. ZILIS: It would be the 78 acre-feet at present. I think that's very
clear under the mandates of this court when it held that water rights
need to be viewed in light of their historic use rather than their
decreed amounts.
QUESTION: Let me ask you this. Suppose the project proceeds and
the water is taken over to the east slope and then the United States
exercises its contract rights which would be clearly senior under
Colorado priorities, right?
MR. ZILIS: Correct.
QUESTION: Now, wouldn't that then totally interfere with the
operation of this project in the future, Arapahoe County's project?
MR. ZILIS: Not necessarily, and again we're looking at future
conditions. But, if Arapahoe County's project came on line, the
projected diversions would average about 120,000 acre-feet per year.
That means that there would still be an excess of 1.1 million acre-feet
available to the Aspinall Unit for all of its various functions.
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QUESTION: My second question is, if the water is taken through the
divide, is it then not available to meet this compact call circumstance
in a prolonged drought cycle, the back up protection for Colorado's
beneficial use?
MR. ZILIS: You know, we do not have to reach that issue in this case
because it's never been used for that purpose. In the initial trial, the
division engineer actually testified that the United States would not be
able to preclude upstream diversions based on compact demands.
However, again, based on the conditions on the river in this case, I
think what we're looking at is water availability based on current
circumstances or the circumstances when the applications were filed in
this case. At that time, it's never been needed for compact purposes.
The two primary functions though, to reiterate, are compact purposes
and consumptive uses. And I think for purposes of this case, you could
conclude that they could call for those water rights. But the only issue
before this court in this case is whether the applicant should be denied
the right to appropriate 100,000 acre-feet under the conditions on the
river at the time the applications were filed. The conditions at that
time were passing 1.2 million acre-feet through the Aspinall Unit
annually, and that would cut that amount to 1.1 million acre-feet,
which are passing through the Aspinall Unit and unavailable for
appropriation in this state. It's generally our position that if the
mandates of this court were followed closely, and if the purposes of
CRSPA and the Congressional directives are followed that there should
be ample amount of water available for appropriation upstream of the
Aspinall Unit.
QUESTION: Here's my concern. My concern is that based on this
project history and the way it was put together and the debates and so
on, there is 240,000 acre-feet that can be used through that project,
apparently, any place in Colorado, east slope or west slope, upon a
contract. And that in fact, the way you've postured the case, does not,
I would ask you to answer, answer the question that in fact, a part of
the bargain made for the building of this unit was that there would be
water available for consumptive use, and it is sitting there, in fact,
under the water rights for the Aspinall Unit, and why isn't this
application then a second and independent dip at the same water?
MR. ZILIS: I don't believe it is a second and independent dip for
several reasons. First, the 240,000 acre-feet that's been set aside for
future contracts has not been yet used, and I think under the
mandates of this court from the first appeal, that one needs to
examine the historic use for that decreed purpose which has only been
78 acre-feet.
QUESTION: But it's sitting in storage for recreation, the flood control,
the fish and wildlife, the National Recreation Area use, is it not? Isn't it
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being used?
MR. ZILIS: It's being used, but as I think is briefed extensively, it's
being used for purposes that are incidental to the primary purposes of
the whole act. If the United States were to take this position at all of
the other Colorado River Storage Project units, it would have control
of the entire Upper Basin and could preclude any diversions by any
water uses in Upper Basin states unless they have a contract with the
Now, I think there's a big difference between
United States.
state law upstream of the Aspinall Unit and uses
under
appropriations
of water directly from the Aspinall Unit. I think if the applicants were
attempting to take advantage of the pool after it's stored in the
Aspinall Unit, that they would very well have to contract with the
United States and would have to purchase that water. However, it's
our position that the Colorado River Storage Project Act cannot
state's
Basin
Upper
the
under
appropriations
preclude
apportionments upstream so that it can sell water from the actual
structures themselves. This position has never been taken at the other
units. In fact, it was not even the position taken on this unit at the
time this application was brought. It has been a new position that has
been taken by the United States, in this case, for the first time ever
and, it was adopted by the water court. And I think that if that
position is recognized, then it will mean that Colorado has given away
the Upper Gunnison Basin and control of that Gunnison Basin to the
United States, which I don't think was ever the intent of CRSPA or the
state of Colorado in authorizing CRSPA and approving of it. If there
are no further questions, I'd like to have John Henderson address this
court regarding the issues surrounding Taylor Park Reservoir. Thank
you very much.
MR. HENDERSON: May it please the court? My name is John
Henderson. I would like to follow up on one question that was asked
to Mr. Zilis about the compact water, and that is Justice Hobbs, if the
United States has been traditionally releasing four or five hundred
thousand acre-feet from Blue Mesa for flood control in the spring in
anticipation of runoff, and Arapahoe County begins to take 100,000
acre-feet of that upstream at each year on average, I'm assuming that
the United States will simply adjust its operations so that it releases less
water in storage for compact purposes for flood control in the spring.
That fits in with the policy of maximization of beneficial use. If I
might say, with all the respect to Sherlock Holmes, sometimes it's the
dog that doesn't bark that tells us the most about a case. In the 300
pages of the opposer briefs here, no one mentioned the actual
historical use of the first fill of Taylor Park Reservoir for irrigation. It's
not because that number is a secret, it's in the decree at section 33a
and at footnotes five and six. The amount, using the larger figure
used at trial by any of the parties, is 21,831 acre-feet of historic first fill.
The second fill was quantified in the trial court, there in 1990, in what
we know as the Upper Gunnison case. That case was affirmed here in

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 4

1992. As a matter of fact, the quantification for the second fill of
Taylor Park Reservoir was affirmed here. That quantification was 19,
905 acre-feet. That is found at 838 P.2d at page 846 where the finding
is discussed and affirmed at 848. If you add those two average figures
together, members of the Supreme Court, it's approximately 42,000
acre-feet, in a basin which produces approximately 145,000 on
average, at the Taylor Park Dam. The evidence is clear as is the
decree, that when the opposers modeled the first and second fill of
Taylor Park they were not constrained to using the first fill water for
irrigation purposes only. We won half of the case that was up here on
appeal in Upper Gunnison-the Upper Gunnison case, that I've cited
to you earlier, decided in 1992. The half we won was that half of that
decree, the irrigation decree, the district being the Upper Gunnison
district, was not able to add additional uses to the irrigation fill. If you
look at this decree at section 37d, you will see that Mr. Helton was not
constrained to modeling historic use of the first irrigation fill. If you
look at 38d, you'll see that Mr. Book was not constrained by the
historic irrigation use of the first fill. And if you read 38d, you will find
that Mr. Book testified that the difference between reservoir releases
averaging 70,157 acre-feet and the diversions of 20,594 acre-feet, the
figure used by Mr. Book, through the Gunnison tunnel for irrigation
equals 49,550 acre-feet, which at the end of the year is transferred to
the Aspinall Unit for use as part of its decreed purposes. That's 50,000
acre-feet a year that they ran down the river and did not use for
irrigation purposes. That 50,000 acre-feet then could be second fill up
at Taylor Park, meaning that on average we lost 100,000 acre-feet per
year of the Taylor River drainage that was not used for historic
purposes. Over a 15 year study period, which we used here, that's a
million and a half acre-feet that vanishes out of the Taylor River
without ever having to be used for a decreed purpose.
QUESTION: Let me ask you this, there's an accounting sheet that is
attached to the court's refill decree. Am I not correct on that?
MR. HENDERSON: That is absolutely correct, Justice Hobbs.
QUESTION: Ok, now, did that accounting sheet vary in any way, or
the assumptions for the modeling vary in any way between the first
time that case was tried on the refill right and the modeling for the
trial that we're now reviewing?
MR. HENDERSON: Indeed Justice Hobbs, as a matter of fact, at
section 36a of the decree in this case, you'll find that the district
modeled the accounting in a different way than it did in the Upper
Gunnison case. The court must also remember that the accounting
sheet is simply a sheet that's attached to a decree. And the decree is
subject to the rules of interpretation in this court. This court has been
emphatic over the decades, that the measure of a water right is its
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historic use for decreed purposes, most recently, in the Santa Fe
Ranches case, which was decided only a month or two ago. In a case
where you're determining if there's unappropriated water in a basin,
it's even more important that when we look at historic use in the basin,
when we're trying to encourage development, that we look at actual
historic use. If you look at the decree for those two cites, that show
that the 37d and 38d, that neither of the opposers model was
constrained to historic use in modeling the first fill, you can see how
they took that water away from us.
QUESTION: Counsel, may I ask you a question please?
MR. HENDERSON: Indeed.
QUESTION: I'm looking at the trial court's position on that topic. I
think it's found at page 22, where he says that basically the argument
you're making to us right now has a lot of logical sense, but in his
opinion it flies in the face of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gunnison District 202203. What do you have to say about that, please?
MR. HENDERSON: Justice Rice, what I have to say is this, and that is
that in 202203, when we argued Upper Gunnison here, seven years
ago, approximately, we had a pretty good idea of what they might do
to us on a retrial of our case, they hadn't done it yet. We lost only half
of that case, but this court did quantify the second fill during almost
the identical historical period at 19,900 acre-feet. They're now coming
back and telling us they've reinterpreted the accounting provisions
and it's now 106,000 in most years, which is the full capacity of the
reservoir. Your Honor, they can't do that without taking that first fill
irrigation right and running it down the stream. We won the part of
that case, Your Honor, where we restricted the right of the first fill to
irrigation use only. The district was not permitted to add additional
uses, including recreation, to that first fill irrigation use. So it doesn't
fly in the face of the holding in Upper Gunnison.
QUESTION: As a matter of law. You're saying that the facts haven't
changed, but as a matter of law it doesn't "fly in the face," it's not
inapposite, is that correct?
MR. HENDERSON: It does not fly in the face of either of those
holdings of this court. Your Honor, if I may summarize, reserving the
rest of our five minutes for rebuttal. We've been up in this court for
more than ten years, twelve to be precise, trying to prove that there's
water available in one of the wettest basins in the state. When we
started this case, I didn't even have kids. They're now approaching the
fifth grade.
This court has held that municipal entities and
appropriators in this state are not to be held to enormous or unusual
burdens in trying to prove that there's water available for
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appropriation. This case is about the heart and soul of the Colorado
River, Justices of the Supreme Court, because if we lose the 2 million
acre-feet out of the Gunnison to California, we're never going to get it
back. And if we accept the position that the United States controls this
river basin and can determine who can appropriate and can determine
that there are not transbasin diversions, then we've lost the river. We
reserve the remainder of our time for rebuttal. Thank you.
MR. SIMS: Good morning, my name is Steve Sims. I'm first assistant
Attorney General. I represent the State Engineer and the Division
Engineer for Water Division 4. With me in the courtroom today is the
Attorney General of Colorado, Mr. Ken Salazar; also at counsel table is
special litigation counsel for the Department of Justice, Hank
Meshorer, and Dick Bratton from the Upper Gunnison District. In the
audience with us is Hal Simpson, the State Engineer of the state of
Colorado, and Wayne Schieldt, the division engineer for Water
Division number 4. Arapahoe County in this case seeks to build Union
Park Reservoir. Union Park Reservoir will be the second largest water
right in the state of Colorado-three times the size of Dillon Reservoir.
Arapahoe County's main problem in this case is that Union Park
Reservoir, the second largest right in the state, is proposed to be
located just immediately upstream from the Aspinall Unit, which is the
largest water right in the state of Colorado. This case is really all about
the priority system. Recognizing senior rights, the historic use of those
senior rights, and not allowing a junior right to divert out of priority.
In the simplest way, that's what this case is really about. The Aspinall
Unit is really the key to water availability for Union Park, and 620f in
the hydro provisions are really the key to understanding the Aspinall
rights. Before I get into that, let me just briefly comment on the ten
minutes of argument that we heard about Taylor Park Reservoir.
Judge Brown kind of hit the nail on the head with those issues to say
that, even if all of Arapahoe County's argument on Taylor Park
Reservoir was correct, that water that they deem to be available for
Union Park would only be able to be diverted by Union Park if
Aspinall would not call. So it assumed, Taylor Park is only relevant if
Aspinall isn't considered.
QUESTION: That's because it's delivered into the Aspinall pool at the
three reservoirs?
MR. SIMS: No, primarily it's because Aspinall is a senior right and can
call out the Union Park Reservoir, and therefore if Taylor Park wasn't
taking the water, Aspinall would be taking the water.
QUESTION: So given the operation of all the state decreed rights for
their purpose, there's, what, 15,000 acre-feet left for appropriation?
MR. SIMS: That's correct.
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QUESTION: Regardless of the modeling assumptions you do on the
refill, right?
MR. SIMS: That's correct. So we're not going to discuss Taylor Park
anymore than that, just because it really doesn't make any difference.
Aspinall is the key. And the key to Aspinall, as I said, was 620f. The
state and the United States are both going to appear before you today
and argue that we are both in agreement that Arapahoe's argument
about 620f and hydro-use is just wrong. And it's wrong for five basic
reasons. First of all, Congress did not intend to impose stricter
conditions on CRSP reservoirs than the limitations placed on any
hydro reservoirs by the compact. All Congress intended was to put
those same hydro restrictions, that the compact put on, on their own
reservoirs. Nothing more, nothing less. So when you look at it that
way, you really have to understand the compact, because the compact
itself makes intrastate water matters off limits. It doesn't purport to
talk to that. There is one provision, article 4c of the 1922 compact, the
Colorado River Compact, that makes it clear that intrastate-within
the state of Colorado-the intrastate water regulation issues, are
completely left to the states. The Compact was not intended to have
any impact on that. Also, we will show that Governor Johnson, then
the Governor of the state of Colorado, when CRSP was being
considered in Congress, actually asked for restrictive intrastate
provisions to be placed on the CRSP reservoirs. Specifically he asked,
he said, that if the CRSP reservoirs are allowed to obtain a hydropower
right, we'll be in the same position that we are in in the Green
Mountain/Dillon dispute. And he said, once the United States got
hydro-rights for that reservoir, they were allowed to call out upstream
water rights. He asked them not to allow hydro-rights to be acquired.
Congress specifically rejected that. When they were having the
discussion in the committee here and Sandra Watkins (all of this is in
my brief), what Sandra Watkins said, well, wouldn't your language
restrict all hydro-generation on these CRSP reservoirs? And Governor
Johnson said yes. So when they actually marked up the legislation,
when they dealt with the legislation that was being discussed in that
committee hearing, about ten days after Governor Johnson's
statements, they struck out any language that referred to waters in the
upper tributaries or in the states, and the reason they gave in the
explanations for why they struck it out was to protect hydropower
generation against other uses.
QUESTION: I'm a little concerned about the argument in the fact that
it suggests to me that perhaps even though there's a theoretical
240,000 acre-foot consumptive use allocation of that project, that the
hydropower rights would be exercised within the state, perhaps even
under the judge's ruling in the trial court, in preference to that
consumptive pool. So what is your response to that?
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MR. SIMS: Well, actually, my response to that is that the 240,000 acrefoot pool-actually, we call it the marketable yield pool because it was
never really quantified at 240,000-the marketable yield pool is
completely consistent with the hydropower uses.
QUESTION: In what way?
MR. SIMS: The water in the marketable yield pool could be used
either upstream or downstream and not detract from the hydropower
uses.
QUESTION: Well, it wouldn't be going through the turbines, would it,
if it was taken across the divide? And apparently you concede, and the
United States concedes, that that pool could be marketed for that
purpose.
MR. SIMS: That's true, it could be. And actually it is being used now.
One misconception that Arapahoe likes to argue is that it's just sitting
there unused. It is being used now. What the marketable yield pool is
really doing is that the marketable yield pool is water that is currently
being used for hydro that they have said they don't need to use for
hydro in the future. They can sell it off and use it for other purposes.
It could be diverted over the hill, it could be diverted upstream, and it
wouldn't affect the economic feasibility of the unit. And that's really
the key, is the connection between that and the economic feasibility.
Did that answer your question?
QUESTION: In some ways it did and in some ways it didn't. The
direct flow power rights that were decreed and made absolute in 1980,
they were to be fully exercised, and that would impinge in using
upstream any part of this 240,000 acre-foot pool. How is that resolved
in regard to the operation of the project?
MR. SIMS: Well, actually, on average, the direct flow rights use about
550,000 acre-feet of water, on average. So those direct flow rights
could be fully exercised and there'd still be water to use, the
marketable yield pool upstream.
QUESTION: Ok, same question with regard to recreation, fish and
wildlife, and the flood control rights. I mean, how does that impact
whether or not the United States is actually going to be in a position to
market any of that water?
MR. SIMS: Well, they certainly, the recreational uses, are mainly within
the reservoir, so anything that gets to the reservoir is used for
recreational purposes.
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QUESTION: I understand, but it wouldn't be there, if it was marketed
to somebody who was able to use it up above.
MR. SIMS: That's correct, and that's water that, just in the project
planning, they said, the whole project would still work even if this
water wasn't here. All the purposes would still work if this water wasn't
here.
QUESTION: I guess all I'm asking you is, the state's taking a position
here that appears to say, that in fact, there was a reserved pool that can
be used for any of the purposes of Colorado beneficial consumptive
use which would go against the Compact entitlement. I understand
Arapahoe County to, in effect, be saying first of all, it's never been
used for that purpose, and we shouldn't be shut down from at least
speaking for that amount of water and much less, maybe 100,000 acrefeet of the 240,000, as long as it isn't being used, and perhaps it'll
never be used, given the state of Colorado's and the United States'
position here, and in fact it's a blocking action to consumptive use
under the Compact.
MR. SIMS: Yes, I understand that's their argument, but the United
States and the State both agree that the 240,000, as you call it now, the
marketable yield pool, is currently being used. That's water that is
being used for these other purposes. And all that the sale or transfer
of that water will do is shift it essentially from one use to another use,
to the consumptive use purposes. So to say that it's just sitting there
not being used, as Arapahoe has, is just wrong. It's currently being
used. And even if it was just a pool sitting there, it's sitting there under
a senior right. It's sitting there, as many reservoirs in the state are,
storing water and making it available for water users to come in and
use. The whole purpose of reclamation law is "build it and they will
come." Unlike other water users in the state, governmental and
municipal water users in the state are not required to have firm
contracts before they actually develop water. Building a dam and
putting it in and holding it is developing water. That's not what's
happening here, but even if that was the case, they would be allowed to
do that because they have a senior water right, and that's the key.
QUESTION: Mr. Sims, am I correct that the net effect of your position
is that no other entity can make use of that 1.2 million acre-feet except
under contract with the United States, and then only except as to the
marketable yield pool, yes?
MR. SIMS: Basically, yes. And it's no different than any other water
user. Once you acquire a water right, once you appropriate it, once
you've developed it, once you've put it in your bucket, it's up to you to
dispose of that water right. And right now, the marketable yield pool
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is that extra part that they can go out and contract to new uses, but if
they never find another user, it's all being used now. And Judge
Brown pointed that out when he was disputing the way that Arapahoe
had characterized this interference, this general subordination that all
CRSP projects must subordinate to any junior water user that comes in
upstream. Judge Brown said no, that's not right, that's an improper
reading of CRSP. CRSP, and Aspinall in particular, have aided
compact development in the state. He made that finding. Jim
Lochhead testified about that. And in the '91 trial, Judge Brown
pointed out some very specific instances in which they had made
compact development possible in Colorado. And that's the Dolores
Project, McPhee Reservoir, and the West Divide Project, which is
Ridgeway Reservoir. These are big, participating projects, Colorado
River Storage projects putting water to beneficial consumptive use for
irrigation. These projects would have a lot of their yield taken away for
water that would have to be delivered for endangered species purposes
on the Colorado River. A lot of the yield of those projects wouldn't be
there, but for the fact that Aspinall makes releases for them, for
endangered species purposes. So this shows one of the ways thatJudge
Brown found, that in fact, there was compact development being
encouraged by Aspinall. And another thing-this goes to another
misconception of Arapahoe's argument-they say the water in Aspinall
has never been used for compact purposes, for delivery purposes,
because there's never been a compact call. Well, there's not supposed
to be a compact call. If everything works the way that the Colorado
River Storage Project and the 1968 Basin Project Act have been
designed, there will never be a compact call. And the way this works is
that they regulate the rivers; this is the whole reason CRSP was built. I
mean, when the Colorado River Compact was negotiated, the
negotiators made a basic mistake, and that mistake was they assumed
that there was a least 15 million acre-feet to divide in the river. There
wasn't. It was more like 12 to 13 million acre-feet. Well, if that's the
case, Upper Basin states who have made a promise to the Lower Basin
states, that they will always deliver 75 million acre-feet over ten years,
they're going to be severely constrained to develop water. They aren't
going to get half, they're going to get much less than half, unless
they've got storage, unless they can take the big peaks in the
hydrograph that occur in the Colorado River and store them and
gradually release them over ten years so it evens out the flow of the
river. If that doesn't happen, then why would you ever build a project
in the Upper Basin? Because in many, many years, you wouldn't be
able to divert anything; and most water users don't put a bunch of
money into a project; even the Federal Government wouldn't put a
bunch of money into a project, if they weren't going to be able to use
it. So that's the real purpose for CRSP, is to even out the flows of the
river. And they have done that. It's worked. The fact that there's
never been a disaster, a compact call, proves it's been working. And
Arapahoe seeks to undermine that. And that's one of the reasons that
the State Engineer is in this case. The State Engineer is neither

Issue 1

ARTICLE UPDATE

opposing nor supporting the project. But the State Engineer is very
concerned about these arguments that could have a drastic impact on
the law of the river. This law of the river has been developing since
even before the compact. It's been developing for 75 to 80 years, and
they're trying to turn it on its head. Just so they can get water available
for their junior project. Perhaps I should mention a couple other
things, because again, if 620f doesn't fly, and I think we've shown that
it doesn't, the house manager's report that's in the legislative historythe final conference report where the Senate and the House
negotiators came together to work out the differences between their
two bills, and they told us why 620f was put in there-what they told us
was it was put in there so everyone would live up to the compact. So
these compromises that were made over the years over hydropower
wouldn't be disrupted, there was no intention to put stricter
requirements on. So if you just look at 620f, we think it is plain on its
face.
QUESTION: But under your interpretation, it would only apply to the
hydropower facilities of Lake Powell, right? It would prevent them
being used at the Glen Canyon Dam to call out Colorado water, isn't
that the interstate issue?
MR. SIMS: Yes, absolutely. We agree with that. 620f was intended just
to make the hydro compromise stick; it wasn't going to change it.
California was trying to change it when they were adopting the statute
and they just wouldn't let them get away with it.
QUESTION: But you're saying the Colorado sponsors of the project
didn't have any concern about the hydropower rights being exercised
in Colorado?
MR. SIMS: Well, absolutely they did. Colorado did not want any
interstate calls. I mean, that was the Upper Basin issue, really. These
big reservoirs should not be extending calls beyond state lines. And
that's when Arapahoe argues that the state's position is going to
prevent any development upstream. They forget that little part of the
argument, which is we have never agreed that Glen Canyon can call
above a state line or that Flaming Gorge can call above a state line, or
that Navajo can call above a state line. Actually the only reservoir in
the system that's purely intrastate is Aspinall. Because remember,
Glen Canyon is built right on the Arizona-Utah border. I mean, the
dam that would be calling would have almost nothing in Arizona that
it could call out. Same with Flaming Gorge, where the dam is built on
the Utah-Wyoming border. There's almost no intrastate area that it
could call out. So that's why we look at 620f as an interstate matter.
Everything in the compact is interstate or interbasin.
QUESTION:

What

about

the

60,000

subordination

depletion
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allowance and the 240,000 marketable yield, 300,000 acre-feet. What's
the state's position with regard to hydropower rights effect on that
300,000 acre-feet?
MR. SIMS: Well, the priority dates of all the rights are the same, so you
couldn't say that a hydro right would call out any of the marketable
yield rights because it's one decree with one priority with multiple
uses. A direct flow right with the exact same date as a storage right is
not deemed to have a better right. I mean, for quite a few years we
have dispelled that notion. So there really is no conflict between the
two, it's just merely the way you operate all these bundles of rights
together. So the hydro couldn't affect the 240,000, if that's a direct
answer to your question, that's our position. Just to sum up a little bit,
there's one other subordination issue that came up besides this
general CRSP must subordinate to any state development, and I think
we've talked about that and I've dealt with that in our brief, but there's
also the argument that since the Bureau of Reclamation subordinated
the 60,000 acre-feet of in-basin upstream depletions, that that
somehow created a selective subordination. And the basis for this
argument was a memo done by Dr. Danielson, the former state
engineer, where in that memo he said I'm going to deem the Aspinall
Unit the most junior rights in the basin because they have selectively
subordinated to these upstream uses. And Ijust wanted to remind you
how the trial court dealt with this, and what the trial court said is, first
of all, we're not sure that this was ever a real policy of the state
engineer. There was a lot of conflicting facts on this and, after they
balanced all of those facts, they said Dr. Danielson was not really
creating this policy where he made these water rights the most junior
in the basin. What he did was he was bluffing and trying to force the
Bureau of Reclamation to come out and formally recognize their
60,000 acre-foot subordination, which had never been done in writing,
and tried to force them into water court to get this decree. But it
wasn't an effort to actually make them the most junior in the basin.
And the court went on to say, even if that was his intent, which it
wasn't, but even if it was the state engineer's intent, the state engineer
didn't have any power to do that. He didn't have any power to make
the Aspinall rights the most junior in the basin. And it's interesting
that he also found, and the division engineer testified at trial, they
never changed the tabulation as a result of that memo either. So that
last subordination is kind of a non-issue. In summary, and I'm going
to turn the rest of my time over to Mr. Meshorer, but in summary,
Arapahoe seeks to disregard the priority system. They want to let their
junior Union Park right divert before the Aspinall Unit rights. And
they've come up with a myriad of excuses as to why that should occur,
but really, the priority system works in Colorado. The Compact does
not change that. 620f does not change that. We have to recognize
these senior water rights. Judge Brown, in a very thorough, complete,
scholarly opinion-he's been dealing with this case for fourteen
years-really did his work. He did a good job. He made the correct
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decisions, and his ruling should be affirmed. Thank you.
MR. MESHORER: May it please the court? My name is Hank
Meshorer, special litigator for the U.S. Department ofJustice. Many of
the issues I was going to talk about were handled well by Mr. Sims, so
I'm going to go to some points that maybe weren't addressed. I want
to mention three things that were undisputed facts at the initial trial.
First, that the trial court found that all of the senior state decrees of
the Aspinall Unit have been continually, without interruption,
uniformly used to their fullest extent. Second, that as part of CRSPA,
Aspinall has been used in a multi-use integrated fashion. Third, that
Aspinall has been operated at all times to assist both the Upper and
Lower Basins to achieve their full allocations of water in accordance
with the various compacts. I could stop right here. Arapahoe says
these facts are disputed. I counted the number of paragraphs that the
water court supports this as matters of fact, and I don't want to list
them because I haven't got that much time, but there are twenty
paragraphs as to the first proposition (and they're all stated in my
brief) that the senior state water right decrees of the Aspinall Unit
have been continuously, without interruption, used to their fullest
extent. Seventeen paragraphs in the court's first order support the
second proposition that Aspinall is operated in a multi-use integrated
fashion. And sixteen paragraphs in the court's opinion all found as a
matter of fact, indicate that the Aspinall Unit, without a doubt, has
been operated to assist both the Upper and Lower Basins. I find it
rather ironic that Arapahoe makes the argument that the federal
government will control the water. I find it insulting, and I would
think it's more insulting to the court than it is to me because it's a
pandering. It comes from weakness. It's ironic that Arapahoe is the
only party in this litigation that seeks federal preemption. They're the
only party that says that the state water decrees need to be preempted
by federal law in three or four instances-hydropower, fish, recreation,
and wildlife. No one else makes that assertion. The question was
asked about the 240,000 acre-foot marketable yield and Mr. Sims
handled that, I think, to the satisfaction of the court. I would add this:
if that water was to be used for other uses, as indicated in my brief, the
Bureau would have to make elections and change the way the uses are
allocated after the NEPA process and all other environmental laws
were complied with. And would most likely, Justice Hobbs, lead to,
and I say most likely because I do not know, that the hydropower
waters would be lessened. The marketable yield is a pool sitting there
for use by anybody in Colorado. Transbasin diversion, they have to pay
for it. The project was built by the Bureau to make water available and
they have to pay for it. The 60,000 subordination was for the western
slope and, as Judge Brown stated exhaustively, was meant to be
restricted to in-basin use, juniors only, and with a contract, and be as
compensatory for the local impact of that huge project. The 240,000
acre-feet of water is not a separate water right. It is not physically
separate. It cannot be carved out and used by Arapahoe at its
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choosing, or by anyone else. If the water's to be used, the Bureau
would have to change its operations. Arapahoe says that these uses
that they challenge are incidental, and incidental uses are not allowed
under CRSPA. First of all, this begs the question if the multiple use
regime, as found by the court as a matter of fact, is not valid. Let's
assume that to be true for purposes of argument. Even if you
segregate these uses out, they've all been used in their totality. As the
court found as a matter of fact, none of them are used solely, just for
one purpose. Arapahoe bases its primary-incidental argument solely
on the ficarillacase. Back up a second. None of the uses of the water
by the Aspinall Unit are incidental. They're all sanctioned by the
CRSPA statute, by the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act, as
primary. Let's assume that one or two of them was incidental. All that
the Jicarillacase says [is] that an incidental use cannot justify a use of
water if that use is contradictory to a primary purpose. Just because it's
an incidental use does not mean it can'tjustify the use of water. Now,
also in the Jicarillacase, the water that was used at the Elephant Butte
Reservoir was for recreation only, and it was not a recognized use
under state law, and it was being used solely for that purpose. It wasn't
recognized in New Mexico because the water was being stored, there
were no buyers, and the City of Albuquerque said we're going to hang
onto this water and use it for recreation until we get a buyer. That was
not a recognized use under New Mexico law.
QUESTION: Did the 1968 Act change the 1956 Act's effect with regard
to the uses of the Aspinall Unit, regarding recreation, fish and wildlife?
MR. MESHORER: The fish and wildlife was a purpose under CRSPA,
Justice Hobbs, but it was again explicitly stated to be a purpose in the
1968 Act, as primary.
QUESTION: As a primary purpose?
MR. MESHORER: Yes sir.
QUESTION: The absolute decrees were obtained in 1980?
MR. MESHORER: Yes sir.-I am not following your question.
QUESTION: I'm just wondering if there's any argument left on it
being an incidental use, if in fact the project is authorized for primary
purposes and include these other kinds of purposes and they match
with the state decrees that were made absolute.
MR. MESHORER: I agree Your Honor, I wasjust making the argument
for purposes of conceding to Arapahoe, which we don't, but to show
that their argument reaches a logical absurdity. That even if these uses
were incidental, and they are not, they are primary. But even if these
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uses were incidental, I think it would only be fish and wildlife. There is
no way you could call compact purposes incidental, or flood control,
but let's say it is fish and wildlife and recreation. Even if they were
incidental, which we say they are not, the statute specifically lists them
as primary. They are consistent with the other primary uses, and
therefore the ficarilla case would not apply. Because ficarilla said only
if a use is incidental and is inconsistent with the other primary
purposes, then it can't be used. Also inficarilla,I would add, that case
did not decide the issue, and did not turn on a CRSPA reservoir, but
on a reservoir built under a different act.
QUESTION: Would you concede that the legislative history and the
project history of the Aspinall Unit does envision that the 240,000 acrefeet in whole or in part might be used on the eastern slope of
Colorado?
MR. MESHORER: Most certainly sir. I see my time is expired. Thank
you.
QUESTION: Rebuttal.
MR. ZILIS: Thank you. The United States and the State essentially
argue that the Colorado River Storage Project Act does not control
operations at the Aspinall Unit. They have now postured this case to
say that you only look at state decrees under state law, and that any
restrictions in the Colorado River Storage Project Act have no impact
whatsoever on how that project is operated. The Colorado River
Storage Project does explicitly state that hydropower generation is
incidental to the primary uses. That's right in the very first section of
CRSPA, section 620f. Section 620f, which Mr. Sims referred to,
specifically states that subject to the provisions of the Colorado River
Compact, neither the impounding nor the use of water for the
generation of power and energy at the Colorado River Storage Project
units shall preclude or impair appropriations for domestic and
agricultural uses under state law. That now means nothing, as far as
appropriations in the state of Colorado.
QUESTION: I have a little problem with that. In California v. U.S., the
court is very plain that absent a specific provision of federal law there is
no preemption and it refers back to state law. Now, are you saying that
that language you just mentioned is so clear that there is a federal
preemption of state water decrees obtained under section 8 of the
Reclamation Act?
MR. ZILIS: Yes I am. I think that that language is absolutely clear that
the federal government cannot preclude instate consumptive uses so
that it can generate power. I think that CRSPA was enacted, in fact
CRSPA was clearly enacted, to allow the Upper Basin states to develop
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their compact apportionments. If the Federal Government were to
take the same position it's taking at the Aspinall Unit at the other
three primary storage units, there'd be no water left available for
appropriation in the Upper Basin states. I think Arizona v. California
was very clear that one must look at the entire legislative scheme, the
direct Congressional objectives, and the scheme for the storage and
distribution of water in determining how it should be interpreted.
And that case, I think, is very enlightening on this issue. We have with
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, but it really set forth the guidelines
on how a court should interpret a specific Congressional directive like
this. Again, if the hydropower operations at CRSPA facilities were
allowed to preclude upper state appropriations, they could virtually
shut down the Upper Basin. That's directly contrary to the whole
purpose that CRSPA was enacted. You had asked whether the state
had taken any position on this issue when the Colorado River Storage
Project was passed.
The Colorado Water Conservation Board
submitted a resolution to the United States Congress, which set forth
several very important points for the state of Colorado. One of them
was that specific provisions should be made in authorizing legislation
to assure that no rights vest in the use of water for power generation in
units of the project which will prevent or handicap the beneficial
consumptive use upstream of the waters of the Colorado River System,
to which any Upper Basin state is entitled. That was Colorado's intent
when CRSPA was enacted. The state has taken a new position in this
litigation, and I will say it has taken a new position for the very first
time regarding this issue. The United States has also never taken this
position at the other Colorado River Storage Project facilities. The
state of Colorado was also very clear that the primary units were not to
infringe on its ability to place water to beneficial consumptive use.
And one more quote from the legislative history, this is again from the
CWCB resolution that was passed on to the U.S. Congress:
Most importantly the hold over storage reservoirs will not fulfill their
primary function if they are so used as to prevent the authorization
and construction of junior Upper Basin projects, which use water
within the apportioned share of any state. Due regard for this
important matter must be made, and all priorities awarded any units
of the project.
The state has absolutely taken the opposite now and says that any water
that passes through the Aspinall Unit is now unavailable for any future
upstream uses.
QUESTION: That's just not the same thing as saying that Colorado is
blocked from developing its compact entitlement, is it? Because every
acre-foot of water that goes across the state line, released from
Aspinall, is credited to Colorado's delivery, allowing other uses within
Colorado on other tributaries, through other projects, on other water
rights. Isn't that correct?
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MR. ZILIS: Well that's correct, Justice Hobbs, however, the way that
the Aspinall Unit is operated under current conditions is that it
basically has all the water, all the inflow, passed down to Glen Canyon
on an annual basis. It's not holding any water back because there
aren't any consumptive uses right now upstream of the Aspinall Unit.
So it needs to pass all that water downstream. But the question really
becomes, what's the difference of having the Aspinall Unit and not
having it? Basically all of those flows would end up in Glen Canyon
anyway. The only thing that the Aspinall Unit has providedQUESTION: But they wouldn't be regulated flows for purposes of the
carry over storage, end of drought cycles, protecting Colorado's
beneficial consumptive use under the compact, would they?
MR. ZILIS: Actually they would, because the Aspinall Unit does not
hold water back. As I think the evidence very clearly shows, it passes an
average amount of 1.2 million acre-feet through every year. It doesn't
hold water back for dry periods. And this water continues to flow
downstream. This is flood control, and I think the U.S. witnesses were
very clear in their testimony that water is released for purposes of flood
control after the flood control function is completed, then water is
stored for compact purposes.
CHIEF JUSTICE MULLARKEY: Thank you counsel. I want to thank
both counsel, all counsel, for your arguments, the case will stand
submitted, and we'll go on to the next case.

